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# THE DEVELOPMENT AND TRAINING OF THE WILL<sup>1</sup>

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It is serviceable, in introducing this discussion, to distinguish between two conceptions of the will, the broad and the narrow. In the narrow, and perhaps usual, sense of the term, the will is identified with deliberation ending in conscious choice. But in the broad sense of the term, the will is consciousness in action. To quote Professor Angell: "The whole mind active, this is will."<sup>2</sup> The broad sense of the term is urged upon us in view of the unity of consciousness, and the consequent inability to find in consciousness a distinct faculty of choosing independent of the other forms of conscious action.

The question as to the development of will contemplates the stages, not sharply distinguished from each other, in the growth of human action from childhood to maturity. Viewing these stages in the large, we may say that men act as they do because of (1) instinct; (2) impulse; (3) imitation; (4) suggestion; (5) deliberation and choice. An act due to any one of these sources may through repetition become habit, or crystallized will. Also the order mentioned may be varied in individual cases; choice may precede, for example, a given case of imitation; but in general the order mentioned may stand as representative. Let us proceed to a description of each of these stages in the development of will, considering in connection with each stage the corresponding training.

## I. INSTINCT

Nothing characterizes the educational theory of the last fifteen years more than the demand that the instincts of children be studied, known, and utilized. The feeling is that somehow here are the bases of individuality, and unless we begin here, we are not begin-

<sup>1</sup> Read at the Conference at Dartmouth College, May, 1905.

<sup>2</sup> *Psychology*, p. 379.

ning low enough down. Of course, the modern initiative in the study of instincts has come from the biological sciences.

The contrast between the earlier and later attitudes toward instincts is rather sharp, showing significantly the modern emphasis on the unity of the organic creation. Until recently it was thought that instinct belonged to the lower animal, in distinction from reason in man. The consequent educational attitude was neglect of the instincts as educational material; or else they were to be rooted out as belonging to the lower nature; or else, indeed, they were to be taught to obey ideas as their governors.

Today, on the other hand, instincts are held to characterize man as truly as they do animals. Man probably has all the instincts that the animal has, and some of them, like constructiveness and imitation, more highly developed. They consequently constitute the alpha of the teacher's material. They cannot be neglected, for they would run riot; they cannot be rooted out, for they lie too deep in the nervous system; they cannot be taught to obey ideas as their governors, for they are instincts, and unwitting of ideas. Taken together, they represent a chaos of conflicting forces and impulses. The wild life of the world is caged in the cerebro-spinal nervous system of the veriest child. The moral problem of elementary education, stated in simplest terms, is the organization of these multiform natural and inherited instincts and impulses.

What is an instinctive act? We wonder at the bird and its nest, the beaver and its dam, the squirrel and its winter nuts, the wasp and its eggs, the bee and its comb, the ant and its organized society, and the child and its toys. All these illustrate instinct. The attempt to define an instinct would take some such form as this: a useful act without prevision of the end in view. Consciousness at first seems to be only a spectator; at most a subsidiary assistant, finding the material upon which the instinct works; but never the director at the beginning.

Physiologically, an instinct is a complex reflex; that is, a series of reflexes following each other advantageously. It is an inherited nervous mechanism, a kind of transmitted ancestral habit.

Into the fascinating biological problem of the origin of instincts we cannot go, as beside our present practical purpose. The student

finds here great names heading conflicting theories: Darwin for "natural selection," Wundt for "lapsed intelligence," and Baldwin for "organic selection."

But our practical question is: How must the teacher deal with instincts in pupils—with these inherited accumulations of all the vast life of the past? Neither neglect, nor oppress, nor extirpate, nor instruct, but direct. Direct their expression toward legitimate objects.

To apply this principle to some of the commoner, and more representative, instincts: Children are naturally constructive? Then provide courses in normal training and domestic science. Children are full of play? Then provide ample recesses and good games, and recognize play as a legitimate educator and not as a necessary waste of time. Children are acquisitive? Then provide shelves for natural-history specimens; encourage collections of stamps, pictures, flowers, etc. Children obey the group or gang impulse? Then let home and school unite in forming proper bands and clubs. Children have a curiosity surpassing any animal? Then answer patiently his question, *Why?* as far as he is able to comprehend, and suggest further related questions to engage and develop his interest. Children have primitive fears? Arouse them not by hobgoblin stories, but make the unavoidable consequences of wrong-doing such as justly to excite their fear. Children so easily fly into a passion? When the fury is past, show the boy some wrong inflicted upon the innocent, and let his anger kindle as a flame to right it. Children are secretive? Agree with them to keep all evil reports about another. Children are so emulous of each other? Confront each one with his own weak past self to excel. They are envious of one another's good fortune? Point to some man of good character as having the best treasure and secure hero-worship. And so on through the list. Study the instincts of children; catch them in the act, and direct them toward a legitimate object. To do so skilfully is actually to fashion the good will.

## II. IMPULSE

By an impulsive act we mean one performed at the mere thought of it; "on the spur of the moment," as we say. "I did it without thinking," the pupils sometimes say self-excusingly. There is a

type of impulsive individual with whom to think is to act. A certain degree of impulsiveness, or ideas leading immediately into action, characterizes child-life. Bain's phrase is "ideo-motor action;" no considerable interval elapses between the mental state and the physical act. To think the word is to speak it; to see the attractive object is to get it; to hear a new sound is to seek its origin; to think of stepping over a certain block in the pavement is to do so; to wonder if the electric light is turned off is to go and see; to want water is to rise and get it; and so on.

The advance here over instinctive action is tremendous. There consciousness at most was a helpful spectator of hereditary responses to physical stimuli; here consciousness is the immediate cause of action. There the response is typical and racial and conservative; here it is novel, individual and progressive. There action was uniform; here it is multiform. In impulsive action the basis is laid for addition to ancestral capital. The individual comes into prominence.

The great danger in impulsive action is that the wrong thing is thought of and done. This cannot be altogether avoided. The only thing to do is for teacher and pupil to recognize such deeds as wrong, to associate pain in some way with the wrong deed, and to trust inhibition through this association to prevent a recurrence. Illustrations of such impulses will occur to you—the impulse to trip up a pupil passing by, to pull the ear of the boy in front, to whistle in school, to whisper to the neighbor, to step on the match on the floor; in general, to do thoughtlessly everything that pops into consciousness.

Also the right thing is sometimes done impulsively. The good thing to eat is shared; the little fellow is protected from his bullies; a fellow-pupil is helped in a difficulty; spontaneous confession of wrong-doing is made; admiration at another's success is expressed; and the like. The good thing impulsively done is to be noted by the teacher and commended. An association of pleasure with the good deed is to be formed, and this association trusted to repeat the deed.

All conscious action passes through the impulsive stage; some action never gets beyond it. The general principle of training here is, to foster the good impulses through desirable and pleasurable consequences, and to checkmate the bad impulses through undesir-

able and painful consequences, and be consistent throughout in so doing. In this early stage of impulsive action our dependence is almost solely on the pleasurable or painful fringes which experience associates with ideas of action. The idea of a wrong deed whose fringe suggests pain will hardly lead to action; of a right deed whose fringe suggests pleasure will probably lead to action. The ideal is to eliminate the impulsive wrong deed, and fix the impulsive right deed.

The impulsiveness which all children possess to some degree, some children possess to an abnormal degree. The impulsive child beyond the average, or beyond the period of mere impulsiveness, requires special description and treatment. He is quickly responsive to all external influences, physical or personal, acting unhesitatingly, and is easily led astray. The painful fringes experience has gathered about certain ideas are not effective in preventing action. Physiologically expressed, there is defective inhibition in the nervous system. He is sometimes described as being "quick on trigger," as "jumping at conclusions." His acts are wanton, without provocation. His nervous system sets quickly in the direction of motor discharge. The channels from cerebrum to muscles are fixed and deep. He is motor in type partly by inheritance, and partly perhaps also by training.

As he passes into the upper grammar grades and the high school, he lords it over his fellows, is showy in his action, is immodest beyond his years, resourceful in emergencies, and doesn't know the virtue of patience. He is motor because his mind is filled with what Baldwin calls "the twitchings, tensions, contractions, and expansions, of the activity of the muscular system." He thinks of movements rather than sights and sounds. His three characteristic mental traits are fluid attention, distinctions difficult to make and to remember, and hasty generalizations.

If these tendencies are not corrected in the secondary school, and the youth comes to college, it is said of him that he has not learned how to study, how to apply himself, how to assimilate. He may be ready and willing and receptive, but is incapable of retaining, because his channels of reaction are worn smooth. He can mouth principles like an old man, but is dumfounded before facts. He

is familiar with authority, but knows little of evidence; he can memorize and imitate, but cannot think and originate.

What shall be the training of the preternaturally impulsive child? To begin with, he does not need the kindergarten as at present conducted. Its emphasis on expression accentuates, rather than checks, his already defective inhibition. The present kindergarten is best for the sensory, quiet, unexpressive child.

Neither can the precipitate child be controlled directly by command, threats, or the rod. Command a restless child to sit still, and within, if not without, you make him tenfold more a child of restlessness than before; you fix his attention on the very thing he is to avoid. The negative and the positive of a picture still represent the same picture to the mind. So a negative command to the impulsive child holds before him the very picture he is commanded not to look upon. Ideas *do* have motor impulses.

The secret is rather to get the idea of a complicated act in his mind. This alone will delay his reactive machinery. If he marks his desk, get him to draw a map, not as a punishment, but to direct his *penchant* into more difficult tasks, requiring hesitation and patience. If he cuts his initials on his seat, engage him in wood-carving. Use his latent interests, but in novel and difficult situations, requiring care and forethought. He should be kept with scholars slightly more advanced than himself. No assistance should be rendered him until the good fruits of discouragement are ripe. Assign him usually the secondary places in sports and games. In a case of real leadership, however—say, an exploring party—give the place to him, where either responsibility may check, or failure teach. Analyze the mistakes made, showing their causes, and the advantages of forethought. Recognize also fully the motor pupil's merit: quickness and promptness.

The studies of such a pupil that should be stressed are those furnishing no immediate opportunity for action, but requiring thought, like mathematics and grammar; those that cultivate careful observation and generalization, the making of accurate discriminations, and that demand attention, like experimental physics and chemistry. Descriptive botany, history, and geography should be held in abeyance to observational studies, unless indeed these be

studied observationally. Arithmetic and geometry are better than algebra, empirical psychology or political economy than deductive logic. Drawing from life or models is good employment for the hands; also the use of neighboring machine shops. In general, this pupil needs the inductive studies, the pursuit of the general from the particular. How prevalent the tendency among pupils throughout the school and college careers to approach facts from the point of view of their likenesses, merging them all together in a general description! Their training above all should be observation and report on single facts. These are the brakes on the wheels of their memory-processes.

The precipitate will, if unassisted, may pass into the pathological conditions of uncontrollable impulses, the so-called monomanias, and insistent ideas.

This, then, is the precipitate type of will and how we may deal with it. But someone will say: "My problem is not with the active, but with the passive child; not with the pupil having too much will, but too little—the hesitant, backward, shrinking, timid child. His will seems to be obstructed; his inhibition is excessive; his ideas are deficient in impulsive character."

This type is, indeed, the other characteristic variation from the normal. We have the normal impulsive will, the abnormal precipitate will, and the abnormal obstructed will. If we call the child with the precipitate will the motor type, we may call the child with the obstructed will the sensory type.

How shall we describe the sensory type of child? He is passive, inert, contemplative, learning new movements slowly, and not quick at taking a hint. Often he gets the unearned reputation from uncomprehending teachers of being dull. He grieves in quiet, is undemonstrative, timid, and learns from a few experiences.

The sensory type is more difficult to assist than the motor. This child is not the open book his brother is. He puzzles us, because he does not reveal himself in speech or action. What he has learned or missed is difficult to determine. His will may be obstructed because of too many ideas that mutually inhibit each other—the Hamlet type, or deficient impulsiveness in the single idea that he has—aboulia. How many of us have not felt "the agony of starting,"



a temporary impotency before a paper to be written, or a letter to be answered?

The great principle in dealing with the obstructed will is in some way to secure expression; to open the flood-gates of nervous energy; to connect mental states with physical reactions; to make action easy. The kindergarten is here indispensable. If it had been framed for the obstructed will, it could not have been better. It teaches the child ease of movement, self-activity, self-confidence, and familiarity with others.

The teacher must make no mistake with the sensory type; for mistakes here do not reveal themselves, but only increase the secretiveness you would remove. First, wait for some positive indication of what the real situation is—understand your child. Then cultivate appropriately self-expression, by letting him recite a great deal, repeat memorized verses; encouraging him to ask questions; giving him the active parts in games, the speaking parts in plays; try him as leader of a tramping party. Especially, be kind in correcting his mistakes. If left to himself, the sensory child with obstructed will is likely to develop into idiosyncrasy and eccentricity; if brought out of himself, the variation may change to genius.

It is probably true that the motor type, whose extreme is precipitate action, predominates with girls, while the sensory type, whose extreme is obstructed action, characterizes boys; hence the common observation that girls seem brighter than boys. It means they are more alert, responsive, ready, quick; not that they have greater mental power, concentration, or constructiveness. In assigned tasks of memory they show better; in matters requiring patient and profound thinking, the boys are better.<sup>1</sup>

### III. IMITATION

Imitation is an instinct; suggestion is an impulse. The discussion of these two, therefore, are particular, but notable, illustrations of the two preceding stages. They are mentioned together because they shade imperceptibly into each other, radical distinction between them being impossible to maintain. Suggestion has the larger connotation, imitation being due to a particular kind of suggestive

<sup>1</sup> In connection with the discussion of the precipitate and obstructed will, cf. Baldwin, *Story of the Mind*, chap. 8.

influence, viz., "suggestibility to models and copies of all sorts."<sup>1</sup> To consider the term of smaller scope first.

By imitation is meant the tendency to repeat the thought or action of another. Its influence is bound up with the social order and permeates all our conduct. MacCunn describes imitation as "one of the earliest, deepest, and most tenacious of human instincts."<sup>2</sup> And concerning its almost universal influence Professor Thorndike writes:

Among the most numerous and the most important causes of the ideas producing action in a human being are the acts of other human beings. Manners, accent, the usages of language, style in dress and appearance—in a word, the minor phases of human behavior—are guided almost exclusively by them. They also control the morals, business habits, and political action of many men on many occasions. As the physical environment decides in large measure what things a man shall see and hear, so the social environment decides in large measure what he shall do and feel.<sup>3</sup>

Coming closer to the subject of imitation, we may distinguish a large and a limited sense of the term. In a large sense, imitation is synonymous with learning, and accounts for all the content of civilization, except that small but weighty fraction added by invention. In the limited sense of the term, it means the influence of personal example; and in this sense only is its discussion of practical educational moment, though such discussion with difficulty avoids platitudes.

What models do children, of younger or older growth, imitate? We cannot answer that they imitate the good and not the bad. Rather, their unreflective deeds are almost indifferent to this distinction. But the interesting deeds, the fascinating, the compelling; even the inherently uninteresting deeds of interesting people; the deeds of a supposed superior; and the deeds of the heroes of all times—all these catch their attention, appeal to natural interests, solicit action. Children imitate the captivating bad fellow, the playground leader, their parents, the teachers they like, and the characters in their favorite stories. They do not usually imitate familiar, commonplace, uninteresting deeds of a supposed inferior, and the described virtues. All these latter fail to catch the attention,

<sup>1</sup> Baldwin, *Dictionary of Philosophy and Psychology*, article "Suggestion."

<sup>2</sup> *The Making of Character*, p. 128.    <sup>3</sup> *Elements of Psychology*, p. 288.

to reach the interest, or to enlist the imagination of children. Describe a virtue, like courage, and children get words; narrate a virtue, as in the story of David, and children get images and ideas. The striking personalities about the child, and the heroes of story, biography, and history—these make the virtues imitable to children; these are the examples that influence.

In what precisely consists the justly celebrated influence of example? The deed of another that has the quality of suggestiveness for us does four things, viz.:

1. It stimulates us to do likewise. There is an impulse to perform an action which we see another perform. Actions speak louder than words, because they are concrete, vivid, and sharp-cut, thus giving attention something upon which to fasten. Example is superior to precept, practicing is better than preaching, because a deed is more suggestive than a word—it inhibits any idea of the act's impossibility, often even of its undesirability.

2. Example provides us with a standard by which we pass judgments on conduct. "Smoking must be all right for me," says the young fellow, "for all the boys smoke, and even such and such a big man also." The superiority of an example to a principle as a standard of moral judgment consists in its clearness, its certainty, its unambiguity; whereas a principle always has to be applied, thereby opening the door to casuistry. Of course, a remote example faces the same difficulty.

3. Examples raise or lower our ideals of living; they fill our minds with a certain pattern of life. Young minds are inevitably contaminated by a permanent evil social environment, as they are inevitably purified by constantly breathing a moral atmosphere.

4. Examples reveal to us our own nature: "Humanity is capable of that; I am a man." We shudder at crime, for it is not far from us; we thrill at self-sacrifice, for it, too, is within our reach. Not a school perhaps in which during the year some character does not flash forth to shame the face of evil and to make shine the face of goodness.

Thinking of these influences of example in our social order, we may say, if examples teach us nothing through imitation, we are geniuses or defectives. For us as practical teachers these considera-

tions demand that we be as genuinely interesting and fascinating personalities to pupils as we can be; that we put the best foot foremost; that our deeds be worthy their imitation; that our sense of responsible living be sharpened, through recognizing our conduct as a contagion; and this last particularly, that through story, biography, fiction, and history we store young minds with vivid images of heroic characters. To quote MacCunn again:

The best *index expurgatorius* is not to be found in a catalogue of books not to be read. Contrariwise, it is the carefully fostered love of good fiction that will in the long run do tenfold more to oust the tales of scandal, frivolity, and crime than a thousand repressive "Thou-shalt-nots."<sup>1</sup>

But personal examples alone are not adequate to the fashioning of will; they have their limitations as springs of action and guides of conduct. To emphasize these limitations of example in the making of character is perhaps the most pertinent point today in the discussion of imitation. We must be brought up almost entirely on example, but we can never become persons by proxy.

Four limitations to the influence of example appear:

1. The influence of example is most valuable, not when it is literally and externally imitated, but when its spirit is caught and reproduced in the new setting. This adds to character independence, originality, genuineness, sincerity, personality. Otherwise, imitating is aping.

2. Any example is particular in place and time; it is individual and concrete. The example, therefore, is not universal; it is not once for all, as such. The great demand that an example makes upon us is not that it be faithfully copied, but that it be understood, assimilated, appropriated.

3. This leads us to note that the best utilization of example presupposes a developed imagination, permitting us to put ourselves in the place of the exemplar. Without this, we may do *what* he did, we cannot do *as* he did.

4. In the words of Professor Stout, "imitation may develop and improve a power which already exists, but it cannot create it."<sup>2</sup> We can become by imitation only what we already are by capacity. The example must presuppose the power in us to respond to it. It is

<sup>1</sup> *Op. cit.*, p. 127.

<sup>2</sup> *Manual of Psychology*, p. 274.

no substitute for individuality. We may look to example for many beneficent influences, but it cannot save us from the duty and the danger of being ourselves.

#### IV. SUGGESTION

The one general principle for securing a conscious act is: arouse the mental state that means that act. Sometimes it is desirable to secure the act through arousing the mental state that means it, without arousing and inhibiting any mental state that would delay, or even prevent, the act in question. This method of securing action is by suggestion. The principle works both when we intend and when we do not intend specific actions. Teachers give suggestions unconsciously as well as consciously.

Suggestion is the tendency of consciousness to believe in and act on any given idea. Consciousness will both believe and act on any given idea that is uninhibited by another idea, as is illustrated in both waking and hypnotic suggestion. By suggestion, customs, fashions, and fads pass through a school like wind-made waves over a grain field. By suggestion the crowd follows the leader. By suggestion the physician renews the faith of his patient in his recovery, and the individual, timid and nervous before some trial, establishes his self-consciousness through self-suggestions of a successful issue. By suggestion we arouse an idea in our pupil's mind leading to the desired act, without arousing conflicting ideas.

Individuals differ widely in suggestibility, some believing and acting on most they hear, others rejecting any foreign suggestion whatsoever. But of practically all children it is true that they are characteristically responsive to suggestions. Indeed, when we speak of the impressionable age, this means the suggestible age.

In a large sense of the word, suggestion is the comprehensive means of educating. In the words of Dr. Otto Stoll:

To educate a human being aright means, on the one hand, to let the suggestions influence him that are suited to his individuality, in order to make him a spiritually sound, ethically good, happy being; and, on the other hand, to remove from him, or paralyze by contrary suggestions all those suggestions that threaten his spiritual health, destroy his character, and kill his vitality, which he needs even more today, when the struggle for existence is carried on with greater bitterness, than in the times of easier modes of living.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> *Suggestion und Hypnotismus*, 2d ed. (Leipzig, 1904), pp. 708, 709.

If several ideas leading to different acts are in consciousness, we have not suggestion, but deliberation with several motives present, and choice. Now, the field in education for the conscious use of suggestion seems to be twofold, viz.: (1) where the pupil could not rightly estimate the motives in deliberation, and (2) where it is important that he should do the right thing, but not important that he should be able to give a reason for so doing. It is evident that young children belong to both these types; they can neither weigh motives, nor is it important as yet that they should learn to do so. George Eliot somewhere observes: "Reason with your child about everything and you make him a monster." The limit to the use of the principle of suggestion is where the act should be reflected upon, the cost should be counted, before the deed is done. As Thorndike observes: "Suggestion as a method of control is risky in cases where training in judgment and choice is one chief benefit of the act."<sup>1</sup>

The art of giving suggestions to children consists in observing two things. The first is that the most effective suggestions are indirect. Commands are less obeyed, or at least less spontaneously obeyed, when they are direct. A direct command subjects the child's will; an indirect suggestion liberates the child's will, and the quality of exuberance characterizes his responsive action. The second thing to observe is that the most effective suggestions are positive. A negative suggestion—that is, the suggestion not to do a certain thing—fills the child's mind with the idea of the very act that he is told not to do, and so by suggestion tends to secure the undesired act. A positive suggestion excludes the possibility even of thinking of the forbidden thing. Suggestions of what to do, rather than what not to do, work best with young minds.

In the work above cited, Dr. Stoll enumerates three kinds of detrimental suggestions which children undergo in home and school alike—suggestions given consciously on the part of parents and teachers, but without full consciousness of their disastrous consequences. These are: (1) suggestions of a painful nature, physical and mental, such as the constant dread of physical punishment; rough mistreatment; mortifying exposure before school companions; shutting up children in dark rooms as a punishment; and suggestions of

<sup>1</sup>*Elements of Psychology* (New York, 1905), p. 287.

frightful supernatural beings. All these pervert the child's mental outlook on the world and take the soul of joy out of its life. He mentions (2) contrary suggestions, by which he means the use of a form or tone of speech not suited to the individual child's disposition, as habitual intimidation, or the inducing of paralyzing fear. Children so treated "are not able to obey a sharp and hastily uttered command to put on a friendly countenance, or to shake hands with a stranger, or to make a circumstantial confession, or even to beg the required pardon in penitent form." Then they get the reputation of being obdurate, and no scolding, nor low marks, nor bodily castigation, seems sufficient to break this *maleficium taciturnitas*. The consequence of such ill-treatment is that in time these children become really insolent, taking pride in suffering the severest penalty rather than obeying such stern exactions.

A single word of love or warm-hearted sympathy in the right way would have broken the spell, without which they are lost; for no property of young souls is more sensitive than the feeling of justice, and no need more intensive than that of love. When both are lacking, the soul becomes dry and hard. If they do not lose their power of physical resistance, such children in later life join the crowded ranks of the dissatisfied, with whom mutiny against the established order has become instinctive. Natures of a weaker organization, however, become timid, solitary, melancholy, upon the bloom of whose young life the frost has fallen, who can never have genuine joy in anything again, for nothing can give them back their spirit.

And (3) Dr. Stoll mentions suggestions of overexcitement. Under this prejudicial influence fall especially lively, energetic, industrious, and conscientious children, and such as are tormented by a vain and overdriven ambition. Incitements to such overexertion are excessive praise from strangers, constant reference to the high grades of other children, and the pressure of examinations. The nervous tension of the school is too high, in consequence of which the health of both body and mind is the sufferer.

So far the injurious suggestions as described by Dr. Stoll. It will encourage us as teachers, in the delicate art of shaping conduct aright through suggestion, to remember that the individual life-history of many a man, perhaps of some of us, is witness to the influence of some apparently incidental suggestion dropped into the receptive youthful mind by a loving, serious, discerning teacher.

## V. DELIBERATION AND CHOICE

At this point consciousness takes possession of action. Hitherto consciousness has been the spectator or the assistant in action originated largely without itself. It now becomes the judge and the executor of action. Here fully the will is consciousness in action.

In this new stage in the development of will the sense of individuality is regnant. No longer simply a follower, one is now also an originator. The power of initiative is developed. The dignity of being a person is felt. All the earlier influences of instinct, impulse, imitation, suggestion, and habit are present in full force, but brought into ordered subjection to the self. Negatively, the new period means self-control; positively, it means self-expression.

In actual extent the part played by deliberation and choice is comparatively slight, but momentous. A choice may reaffirm a bad habit that shall reduce future life to servitude, or it may support a good impulse that will liberate the divine power resident in manhood. What an adolescent is may be credited mostly to his heredity and environment; what he becomes must also be credited to himself. This period means the enthronement of reason, either to rule or misrule.

By deliberation we mean the estimating of impulses to action, or motives, and their consequences; and by choice we mean the mind's affirmation of one of these motives, thereby inhibiting the others. A deliberate act is thus one performed after reflection. Our first deliberate acts are probably attempts to correct wrong impulsive acts. The essential function of a deliberate act is to prevent hasty, and so possibly wrong, reactions to stimuli, and to secure right reactions; in short, to secure most beneficial reactions on stimuli. The highest type of responsive action is intelligent.

The possibility of a deliberate act thus presupposes several things, viz.: (1) time to think, a period of hesitancy and uncertainty; (2) several apparently open possibilities of action, held before consciousness as "ideas;" (3) as these ideas are all more or less attractive to consciousness, there are conflicting motives or desires, a motive or desire being just the attractiveness of an idea for consciousness; (4) there may also be present an ultimate motive, or standard, by which the others are to be estimated, e. g., the desire to do right, the



intention to succeed regardless of means, etc.; and (5) choice, or the selection of one of the ideas to follow. In short, a deliberate act is the resolution of conflicting desires.

As everywhere in mentality, and nowhere more noticeably than in deliberation, individual differences appear. Professor James enumerates "five chief types of decision," as follows: (1) the reasonable type, which adopts without effort or restraint the alternative favored by the balance of arguments; (2) the drifting type, which follows a course accidentally determined from without; (3) the reckless type, which follows a course accidentally determined from within; (4) the converting type, whereby "we suddenly pass from the easy and careless to the sober and strenuous mood;" and (5) the effort type, in which with a feeling of effort we choose the hard right thing rather than the easy wrong thing. Any individual may at different times illustrate each type; he also probably tends to conform generally to one of the types.

It is evident that the nature of deliberation and the types of choice determine the kind of assistance which the educator may render pupils who have reached this stage of development. In general but two things are necessary here, which, however, are very comprehensive, viz., the knowledge of the right, and the disposition to do it. To consider each of these separately.

First, the knowledge of the right. When pupils are beginning to think for themselves, the time has come for direct ethical instruction. So far, our treatment of instinct, impulse, imitation, and suggestion constitutes what we may call the indirect education of the will; that is, through action rather than through ideas. At this point, in dealing with deliberation and choice, we come upon the direct education of the will; that is, through the mediation of ideas. The fully fashioned will must be instructed; an uninstructed will, however faultless its conformity to right standards, does not possess itself. To do right through choice presupposes a knowledge of the right. Pupils who are deliberating, and so can use knowledge in the direction of conduct, must be taught what the virtues and duties are. This should be done incidentally by all teachers in all fitting connections, and also specifically in connection with an elective high-school course in ethics. To fit teachers for this work of incidental

as well as specific ethical instruction, the training of teachers should include a careful study of ethics and practical sociology. Such training would enable teachers to indicate to pupils the ethical bearings of all classroom questions on practical living. We require teachers to be of good moral character, but we do not require that they should know the elements of morality.

The ethical instruction in the schools, in order rightly to mediate conduct with ideas, must include, as a minimum, teaching (1) the duty of deliberation; "to think is the moral act," says Professor James; it holds the equilibrium of ideas until the die be cast aright; (2) the instillation of a moral ideal as a standard by which to judge motives, to follow this ideal being the ultimate motive of all choices and living; (3) teaching the consequences of good and bad choices upon self and others ere they are made. Put the moral experience of the race at the disposition of the young deliberator. In short, after deliberation arises, the first essential in the training of the will is the training in right ideas.

Socrates, indeed, thought that this was enough; that knowledge is virtue; that virtue could be taught; that, if a man knew what was right, and that it was good for him, with pleasurable consequences, he would do it, for every man is seeking what is good, that is, pleasurable for him. Plato also thought it was enough; that all vice is involuntary, and due to the lie of ignorance in the soul. This is the intellectualism of Greece. With Socrates and Plato we may at least so far agree: Without knowledge, no virtue (there may be innocence). Indeed, we may go farther and say, in accord with Bain's principle of ideo-motor action: To know the right is to be tempted to do it; also, to think of nothing but the right is indeed to do it.

But what these great moralists of Greece fail to note, the voluntarism of Christian thinking recognizes. It is possible to see and approve the better and follow the worse. Human nature is weak and does not always respond to the ideas of the right; it is thoughtless, and fails to remember the right; it is inattentive, and lets the right slip out of consciousness; it is prone to evil, and lets pleasure of wrong-doing fill the focus of consciousness. In addition, then, to training in right ideas, we need—

Second, the disposition to follow them. Here the teacher's task is indeed difficult. Virtue cannot be taught. Character is not a gift, but an achievement. How shall he cultivate the disposition in pupils to do as well as they know? Our reliance may be placed in these three things, viz.:

1. The indirect education of the will which has preceded deliberation during many years, all of which gives moral tone, and receptivity, and responsiveness to moral ideas. As Aristotle, that wise and catholic moralist, observes: "The man who has had a good moral training either already has arrived at principles of action, or will easily accept them when pointed out." Direct education of the will through ideas, to be effective, must presuppose indirect education of the will through action.

2. The definite placing of responsibility upon young thinkers and actors. It sobers; it increases the moral stature; it develops the sense of responsibility. Systems of school management that relieve older pupils of the duty of looking after themselves need not be surprised if they are unable to do so when left to themselves. The college boys that give most trouble come from paternalistic schools. The adolescent pupil must learn to choose by choosing. To shield him from bad choices by refusing him all choices is disastrous in the end. Like the race, he too must take counsel of his mistakes. To save from blunders at any cost is not a principle of moral education. President Eliot writes:

This cultivation [of the will] can come only through choosing and doing; it cannot come through submission, unreasoning obedience, inaction, or any sort of passiveness. In this respect a child's training closely resembles a whole people's training. Democracy makes choices and decisions, and acts for itself.<sup>1</sup>

3. Cultivate the disposition to follow the right by dealing with the individual pupil according to his type of decision, when you can. With the rational type, it is necessary only to reason together in private. With the drifting type, you must attach him so closely to yourself that he may feel the momentum of your current. The reckless type is to be treated as the overimpulsive child above. The converting type of decision every pupil should be led to make in conjunction with the agencies of the church before leaving the secondary

<sup>1</sup> "The School," *Atlantic Monthly*, November, 1903.

school. Never again will life seem half so serious as to the graduating high-school pupils. It is the time to set the nervous system on the high level. The effortful type of decision will take care of itself; here we have not to teach, but to learn.

Thus we have passed in rapid review the development and training of the will. Fit occupation, this, for honest souls, brave hearts, and strong minds! We have seen the importance of knowing and directing the instincts of pupils; the necessity of strengthening right impulses and inhibiting wrong ones; the way to check the over-impulsive and to forward the underimpulsive child; the kinds of models that children imitate and refuse; the effective way to give a suggestion, and the detrimental suggestions from the home and school order from which our pupils are suffering; and the two essentials in the direct education of the will. But when all is said and done, the training of the will is no easy matter. We must bungle and botch many more pupils' wills, and pray God's forgiveness, before the school and the home can develop character aright. But patient study and more patient endeavor will here as elsewhere bring us slowly on our way, and in the end bear their perfect fruit. Meanwhile, the sum of it all is: We truly educate the will when, through any or all of these ways, to immaturer selves than our own we freely give ourselves, who are Christ's, Who is God's.